Tri odlične kritike transhumanističke singularnosti

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   Petak, 08 Ožujak 2013 00:00

Nicholas Carr: The other digital dualism

What’s striking about the neo-Cartesian, or digital dualist, view is how it manages the neat trick of incorporating both extreme humanism and extreme misanthropy. Since what’s “good” about us is what’s not “the animal thing,” we are given a superior position to all the other animals with whom we share the earth, they being the mere “monkeys that walk around.” This sense of our unique specialness is combined with a deeply misanthropic hatred for the human body, which, by linking us back to mere animals, prevents us from fulling the immortal destiny of pure intelligence. “If I can go into a new body and last for 10,000 years,” said Hillis, “I would do it in an instant.” This view is, needless to say, very close to certain religious conceptions of the body and the soul, though what it lacks is any attempt to put a brake on hubris.

Colin McGinn: Homunculism

What is this grand theory? It is set out in chapter 3 of the book, “A Model of the Neocortex: The Pattern Recognition Theory of Mind.” One cannot help noting immediately that the theory echoes Kurzweil’s professional achievements as an inventor of word recognition machines: the “secret of human thought” is pattern recognition, as it is implemented in the hardware of the brain. To create a mind therefore we need to create a machine that recognizes patterns, such as letters and words. Calling this the PRTM (pattern recognition theory of mind), Kurzweil outlines what his theory amounts to by reference to the neural architecture of the neocortex, the wrinkled thin outer layer of the brain.

The (Future) Automation of Labor, and Some Notes on “Mind,” “Intelligence,” and the Google Singularity

The use of the term “intelligence” in the fields of AI/Cognitive Science as coterminous with “mind” has always been a red herring. The problems with AI have never been about intelligence: it is obviously the case that machines have become much more intelligent than we are, if we define “intelligence” in the most usual ways: ability to do mathematics, or to access specific pieces of information, or to process complex logical constructions. But they do not have minds–or at least not human minds, or anything much like them. We don’t even have a good, total description of what “mind” is, although both philosophy and some forms of Buddhist thought have good approximations available.  Despite singulatarian insistence, we certainly don’t know how to describe “mind” outside of/separately from our bodies, as recent work like Anthony Chemero’s Radical Embodied Cognitive Science show so thoroughly.

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